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Abstract The fishery is a classic example of market failure.
Government intervention does not necessarily correct this, but
may instead seek economically inefficient solutions, because of
either a deliberate trade-off between efficiency and equity or polit-
ical expediency. Norway's fishery policy is seen as a case in point.
Its stated objectives put a low priority on economic efficiency,
while various objectives based on equity are put in the fore-
ground. The result is that the contribution of Norway's fisheries
to the national income is slight. Norway's fishery policy consists
of two largely uncoordinated parts, one concerned with main-
taining fishermen's incomes and the other with managing fish
stocks.
Since the introduction of the 200-mile limit, most fish stocks
exploited by Norway have been managed by total allowable
catches (TACs). While this has prevented the depletion of fish
stocks, the regulations introduced to enforce the TACs have been
an economic failure. The setting of TACs has in some cases re-
vealed a willingness to attain solutions expedient in the short
term at the expense of long-term benefits.
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Introduction
The fishery is a classic example of an industry in which competitive
markets fail to achieve efficient allocation of resources. Like all
other common-property resources, fisb stocks tend to be overex-
ploited. Government regulation for the purpose of correctitig the
inefficiency generated by unbridled market forces is the remedy pre-
scribed by Paretiati welfare economics.
It has long been obvious to economists witb some knowledge
and experience of fishery policy that few, if any, governments seem
to follow the Paretian prescription very closely. This observation
does not apply to fishery policy alone; other industries provide sim-
ilar examples. The inefficiency associated with excessive harvesting
of fish stocks is usually corrected to some extent, but is seldom
eliminated. What is still worse, the regulators usually create ineffi-
ciencies of their own.
Why does regulation generate inefficiencies? The ideal govern-
ment assumed by Paretian welfare economic theory is concerned
not only with efficiency but also with equity. In the real world it is
not as easy to attain the two goals at the same time as the conveti-
tional assumptions of lump sum taxation would have it. Therefore
governments are often forced to make deliberate trade-offs between
equity and efficiency. The gap between reality and the ideal of
Paretian welfare economics is even wider, however. Governments
are not made up of disinterested individuals trying to maximize a
Bergsonian social welfare function. Like the rest of us, people in
government (whom we shall call "politicians," not in a derogatory
sense but for the sake of brevity) may be expected to try to ad-
vance their own interests. Although politicians in democratic soci-
eties have to face judgment by the electorate periodically, they may,
in fact, best secure their tenure by intervening in markets against
the public interest. The general public's myopic perception of eco-
nomic benefits helps to explain this apparent paradox. Even if mar-
ket imperfections—such as monopolies, tariffs, or overexploitation
of common-property resources—lead to an aggregate loss of eco-
nomic welfare, there are always individuals or groups who gain
from such arrangements. Typically such gains are concentrated inNorway's Fishery Policy 117
relatively few hands and are, tberefore, clearly recognized by those
who benefit, while the advantages that would accrue from the elimi-
nation of such inefficiencies are widely dispersed and not as easily
perceived. As a result, the individual citizen tends to be preoccupied
with protecting or seeking some market distortion to his or her own
advantage, thus giving politicians the incentive to advance their
own interests by maintaining or creating such distortions instead of
correcting them. Inefficiencies that we fmd in regulated markets
need not, therefore, be the result of deliberate trade-offs between
efficiency and equity; instead they may be due to political interven-
tion on behalf of special interest groups.
In this paper we examine Norway's fishery policy in this light. In
the next section we discuss the policy objectives as stated in rele-
vant official documents. Economic efficiency is only one of these
objectives and has, at times, faded into the invisible background,
while the maintenance of employment and the support of disadvan-
taged areas are listed as overriding goals. As the documents make
clear, these objectives are based on considerations of fairness; in
particular, equal distribution of income and welfare. The question
that immediately arises, however, is whether or not such laudable
objectives require workers to be employed in fisheries where their
contribution to the national income is negligible or even nonexis-
tent. The trade-off between equity and efficiency appears to have
been weighted heavily in favor of the group interests of fishermen.
Given the relatively low priority attached to economic efficiency,
it is not surprising to find that Norway's fishery policy consists of
two largely disconnected parts—an income maintenance policy
and a fish stock management policy. As every resource economist
knows, the support of fishermen's incomes has repercussions on the
level of fishing effort and the effectiveness offish stock management.
In Norway, support of fishermen's incomes has precipitated exces-
sive catch capacity in most fisheries. The development of income
support policy will be traced in the third section.
Finally, management offish stocks will be considered in the last
section. Before the introduction of the 200-mile limit, fish stock
management amounted to little more than regulation of mesh size,
arrived at in agreement with other countries, in an attempt to miti-Rognvaldur Hannesson
gate the consequences of excessive fishing effort. The migratory
character of most fish stocks in Norwegian waters necessitates
agreements with one or more neighboring countries for effective
management, despite the 200-mile limit. To this end, general agree-
ments have been concluded with neighboring countries under
which catch quotas are negotiated every year. In most cases the
Norwegian quotas have been much smaller than needed to keep
fishing vessels fully utilized, which has often led to detailed regula-
tions. These regulations cause inefficiencies of their own, in addi-
tion to the inefficiency inherent in too many men and boats chasing
a limited number offish. Surprisingly little attention seems to have
been given to the long-term objective of what catch quotas would
be in Norway's best interest, and how much capital and labor
would be needed to catch them effectively.
The Objectives of Fishery Policy in Norway
Although Norway has been ruled by governments of different po-
litical hue during the last 20 years, fishery policy has been little
affected. Such policy changes as have occurred owe more to alter-
ations in circumstances and the prevailing mood ofthe times than
to shifting political regimes. Three documents, the first two drafted
by Labor governments and the latest by a Conservative govern-
ment, are especially important as sources for policy objectives. A
1964 General Agreement between the government and the Fisher-
men's Association, which is still valid, states explicitly that the
economic assistance given to the fisheries should aim at restoring
profitability {Stortinysmelding, 1964-1965). The Long-Term Plan
passed by the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) in 1977 is not
particularly concerned with profitability, but lists three primary
policy objectives: (1) preservation of the pattern of settlements;
(2) provision of employment; and (3) conservation of fish stocks
{Storfingsmctding, 1977-1978). These three goals are, to some ex-
tent, mutually inconsistent and incompatible with efficiency. In
the Guidelines for Fisheries Policy submitted to the Storting in
1983 (Stortingsmelding, 1982-1983), the pendulum has swung back
slightly. Here profitability is emphasized and recognized as being
incompatible with the three previous objectives, which are never-Norway's Fishery Policy
theless still affirmed as valid. We shall next take a closer look at
the three policy objectives.
Preserving the Pattern of Settlements
Preindustrial technology made a pattern of scattered settlements a
necessity for whatever precarious living could be wrested from
Norway's harsh countryside and capricious seas. Industrialization
atid moderti technology have changed this radically, but the pat-
tern of settlements responds with a certain time lag and social ten-
sion. Fishing settlements, for example, were established as closely as
possible to the fishing banks, on isolated islands and peninsulas, a
need that modern technology and communications have elimi-
nated. Today these sites are at an economic disadvantage, and vari-
ous forms of government support have been required to maintain
them.
In terms of economic growth and efficiency the Norwegian policy
makers' commitment to the maintenance of an obsolete pattern of
settlement makes little sense. The roots of this policy are partly
emotional; on a more prosaic level, its widespread acceptance if not
support can be explained by the general public's myopic perception
of economic benefits. The advantages flowing from the policy of
supporting economically disadvantaged settlements accrue to com-
paratively few individuals and are channeled through government
institutions and special interest organizations, whose professionals
are both influential and articulate. The costs of this policy are
spread widely because they are financed out of general government
revenue. Some costs are even hypothetical, such as benefits forgone
by weakening incentives to seek more productive use of labor and
capital.
The settlement policy serves some interest organizations ex-
tremely well, particularly the interests of farmers and fishermen.
While it is invariably invoked in support of subsidies to fishing and
farming, most of these transfers end up as rents to intramarginal
production units. As a case in point, the larger part ofthe subsidies
allocated to the fisheries is used to raise the ex-vessel price of fish.
While the marginal fisherman just breaks even, the subsidies benefitRognvaldur Hannesson
intramarginal fishermen in an inverse relationship to the;r oppor-
tunity costs.
Provision of Employment
Most of Norway's fish and fish products are sold in fon-ign mar-
kets where Norwegian influence on prices is limited at best. The
provision of attractive and secure employment opportunit:es would
therefore seem to imply the pursuit of economic efiiciency. This is
not the case. As we shall show in greater detail in the following sec-
tion, the government has gone a long way toward guaranteeing
fishermen an income on a par with comparable occupations, using
subsidies to boost the otherwise insufficient profitability oi the fish-
eries. The justification for this policy, in terms of efficiency, would
call for conditions either of general unemployment or of severe geo-
graphical or occupational immobility among those emplo-ed in the
fishing industry. Both of these justifications seem far-fetched. First,
the level of unemployment in Norway is of the order of 3 to 4 per-
eent ofthe work force, which is more than twice as much as it was
in the 1960s and 1970s but is still low enough to be characterized
as mainly frictional. Secondly, Norwegian fishermen geneially pos-
sess skills and abilities demanded by other sectors ofthe economy.
Such alternative employment would, however, often require geo-
graphical mobility, thus contradicting the settlement policy.
Conservation of Fish Stocks
Conservation of fish stocks, appropriately interpreted, is the es-
sence of normative fisheries economics. The theoretical literature
on the subject shows how optimal resource stocks are jointly deter-
mined by economic and biological parameters. Although many
Norwegian civil servants, as well as some people in the fishery
sector itself, are familiar with this theory, its impact on policy is
slight. In practice, conservation usually means one of two things: (1)
avoidance of irreversible disasters; that is, not reducing fish popula-
tions below threshold levels at which they are unable to replenish
themselves; or (2) maintenance of a standing stock to give maxi-
mum sustainable yield. Management for the purpose of maximizingNorway's Fishery Policy 121
the economic rent a stock is capable of yielding is an objective
which is conspicuous by its absence.
It is not, therefore, an exaggeration to describe Norwegian fish-
eries policy as proceeding on two separate stages without any
coordination, one supporting 1 shermen's incomes and the other
managing fish stocks. This dichotomy may have been easier to
understand in the past, when mi nagement offish resources outside
national boundaries was a cumbersome and self-defeating process.
However, after the general exteasion of fishing limits in the latter
half of the 197O's, fish stocks occurring in Norwegian waters have
come under the joint control of Norway and her neighbors. Under
these circumstances, it is certainly irrational to ignore the implica-
tions that fish stock management holds for the economics of the
fishing industry. Although Norway cannot expect other countries
to agree to its first best option for fish stock management, it should
certainly be of interest to know what is the second, third, or nth
best economic option. Furthermore, having agreed on a stock man-
agement policy that is perhaps the Hth best, it would still be impor-
tant to know the optimal fleet capacity corresponding to that
option.
With this introduction in mind, we shall, in the two following
sections, consider in further detail these two approaches to
fisheries policy—support of fishermen's incomes and fish stock
management. »
Income Support Policy
The fishery is comparable to agriculture in many respects. Easily
perishable primary products are involved; prices fluctuate under
the impact of variations in supply caused by the vagaries of nature;
and demand is inelastic, so that gains in productivity translate eas-
ily into steeply falling prices. A large number of people are involved,
selling their labor indirectly through primary commodities, their
incomes being determined by the prices of these commodities. The
income-generating role of prices readily conflicts with their role as
signals for efficient allocation of resources, and political pressures,
together with generally accepted income distribution criteria, com-
pel governments to intervene. Such scenarios are familiar to agri-.TTii'
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cultural policy in the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC) as well as in other parts ofthe world.
Fishermen's Marketing Boards
In the 1920s and 1930s the incomes of Norwegian fishermen were
repeatedly curtailed by the falling prices offish, with price volatility
posing an additional problem. Hence the income support policy
for fishermen began with an attempt to raise and stabilize the prices
of fish. An important institutional change to this effect was the
introduction in 1938 of a law (amended in 1951) giving monopoly
rights of selling fish to a number of marketing boards operating
on behalf of fishermen. The law stipulates that no fish may be sold
except by or with the consent of these marketing boards. At present
there are 12 marketing boards in existence, each enjoying monopoly
rights for a particular region or set of species. The marketing boards
differ in the strategies they follow to accomplish their objectives;
some sell the fish by auction, while others practice price discrimina-
tion among end uses. To a large extent the choice of strategy is
dictated by circumstances. Some marketing boards in southern
Norway sell their fish by auction, while the marketing board oper-
ating in northern Norway has resorted to price discrimination, since
buyers there are more widespread and end uses more varied. The
effect of organizing the market in this way is to give fishermen the
largest attainable share ofthe revenue obtained by selling fish and
fish products to domestic or foreign consumers. This policy, it would
appear, boosts fishermen's incomes at the expense of processors
and traders, but it is not the whole story. A fishermen's monopoly
may be able to indirectly extract monopoly rents from the markets
for finished products through price discrimination. In addition to
diverting rents from processing and trading to the fishermen, the
ex-vessel price may be used to discourage competitive processors
or exporters from depressing the price of the finished product by
buying too much fish at the point of landing (Hannesson, 1985).
There is some evidence that the demand curve for Norwegian dried
fish in the Italian market is downward sloping and one would
expect the same to be true for dried and salted fish in countries
such as Nigeria and Brazil, while the market for frozen products
appears to be competitive. The marketing board operating in north-Norway's Fishery Policy 123
ern Norway lists different prices for fish according to whether it is
to be frozen, salted, dried or sold fresh, but to what extent it tries
to take different price elasticities of finished products into account
we shall not venture to judge.
The 1964 General Agreement
A second major step in income support policy was taken in the
early 1960s, a time when the fisheries had lagged behind manufac-
turing in terms of productivity and earnings. Funds previously
accumulated through tbe taxation of exported fish products had
been exhausted in support of fishermen's incomes, and direct gov-
emment support was increasing. This support was finally institu-
tionalized by an agreement (ratified by the Storting) between the
Ministry of Fisheries and the Norwegian Fishermen's Association.
The agreement gives the Fishermen's Association the right to
demand negotiations with the Ministry of Fisheries concerning
support to fishermen whenever their "earnings potential" is not
comparable to incomes in other industries {Stortingsmelding, 1964-
1965). Precisely what "comparable" means or which industries fish-
ermen should compare themselves with is not further specified. It is,
of course, not surprising to find ambiguities in a document such as
this; it would be economically and politically unwise to undertake
a precisely defined obligation to support a specific industry, re-
gardless ofthe economic circumstances or political expediency that
might prevail when that support comes due. Still, the agreement
does appear to acknowledge the important principle that it is the
government's responsibility to provide fishermen with adequate in-
comes. This is quite different from claiming that it is the responsi-
bility of government to provide an adequate income for all by
pursuing a policy of full employment and supporting the disabled
and involuntarily unemployed. If universally implemented, a policy
of unconditional income support in a particular industry would
ultimately destroy the link between profitability and incomes, which
would paralyze any market economy.
The ambiguous wording of the agreement affords great leeway
as to whether support for fishermen's incomes is called for. Should
support be given only under exceptional circumstances, contingent
upon restructuring the industry to enable it to support itself? Or124 Rognvaldur Hannesson
should any minor deviation of fishermen's incomes from some norm
be compensated, regardless ofthe profitability ofthe industry? Until
the beginning ofthe 1980s, implementation ofthe agreement moved
closer to the latter interpretation, but the terms of the agreement
itself and the documents accompanying it to the Storting show that
those who drafted it did not intend to support the fisheries perma-
nently. Any support given was intended to promote efficiency and
rational development. The agreement stated explicitly that direct
subsidies of landings (price subsidies) should be phased out before
the end of 1968. At the insistence of the Fishermen's Association
and other interest organizations in the fishing industry, the phasing
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FIGURE I. Government support for fisheries, 1965-1982, at current and 1965
prices {Source: Stortingsmelding No. 93, 1982-1983). ---, Current expenditure
in million "kroner"; , 1965 "kroner"; , average in 1965 "kroner."Norway's Fishery Policy 125
event that increased efficiency, together with advantageous devel-
opment of prices and costs, would sufficiently improve fishermen's
incomes. Figure 1 shows annual subsidies to fisheries since the
General Agreement was concluded.
Consequences of the Income Support Policy
The income support policy appears to have been successful in
providing fishermen with incomes comparable to those obtained










FIGURE 2. Fishermen's remuneration per year, in percent of average income
per year for all wage and salary earners in Norway. ----, Trawlers larger than
200 GRT; , purse seiners; , coastal vessels in Troms;
coastal vessels In western Norway. [Source: "Budsjettnemnda for fiskenaeringen,"
Lennsomhetsundersekelser (profitability investigations).]Rognvaldur Hannesson
year as a percentage of the average income of all wage and salary
earners in Norway. While the annual incomes of fishermen are
much more variable than the average of all employees, there is no
clear trend over the period considered (1969-1982). Trawlermen
and purse seine fishermen, for instance, obtain incomes up to twice
as high as the average of all wages and salaries, which places them
well ahead ofthe average worker in, say, the construction industry.
F"ishermen on coastal vessels, of which two representative groups
are shown in Figure 2, are on a par with or perhaps a little below
the average wage and salary earner, but still slightly above the
average income in manufacturing. While one may argue at length
about what "equitable incomes to fishermen" really means, the
point is that fishermen's incomes have risen at approximately the
same rate as average incomes in other industries, an accomplish-
ment achieved by a substantial subsidization of the fisheries, as
indicated in Figure 1. Table 1 shows that government subsidies
amounted to almost half of value added in the years 1975-1979,
jumping to about 80% in 1980.
The output of Norwegian fisheries for the years 1962-1982, as
well as the input of labor and capital at fixed prices, is shown in
Figure 3. This is one ofthe cases where it is, in fact, more meaningful
to add apples and oranges than to use exchange values, since price
subsidies distort the value of landings. A more meaningful index
of output is obtained by adding the catches of similar fish species.
We have identified two main categories of fish for this purpose.
First, there are the pelagic species, including capelin, mackerel,
herring, and other types used mainly for producing meal and oil.
Then we have the so-called codfishes; that is, cod, haddock, saithe,
and so forth, used for human consumption. From 1965 to 1967 the
catch of pelagic species rose rapidly, while subsequent years were
characterized by large variations in output but no long-term in-
crease. However, the curve conceals an important change. Before
1967, herring provided the bulk ofthe catch. But after the collapse
ofthe Atlanto-Scandian herring stock in 1968, capelin has been the
main source. Catches of cod and similar species increased gradually
up to 1972, but since then have remained the same or even declined.
The Norwegian fisheries may therefore be said to have stagnated
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FIGURE 3. Indices of output and input of labor and capital in the Norwegian
fisheries, 1962-1982. , Pelagic species (capelin, herring, mackerel, etc.);
. codfishes (cod, haddock, saithe, etc.); -•- -, capital at 1975 prices; ,
man-years. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, Statistical Yearbook,
Fisheries Statistics, Oslo, various years.
continued to increase until 1978, wbile the input oflabor stopped
declining after 1975.
It is tempting, to say the least, to ascribe the increase in the input
of capital and the sustained input of labor, despite stagnated or
declining output, to the high level of subsidization from 1975 on-
ward. We seem to be confronted here with a classic policy dilemma:
measures designed to affect the distribution of income also affect
the allocation of resources, and in an undesirable way. In this case,
there are too many boats and fishermen chasing too few fish, which
is not a trivial problem in an economy where there is nearly fullNorway's Fishery Policy 129
employment and excess demand for investment funds. Worse stili,
an income support policy is likely to be self-perpetuating. This
policy leads to increased fishing effort, which in turn depletes fish
stocks, causing productivity to decline; to complete the vicious
circle, higher subsidies are required to maintain incomes. Policy
makers in Norway have, in the past, been surprisingly untroubled
by this mechanism, but recent pohey papers {Stortingsmelding,
1982-1983) show a growing awareness and concern.
Management of Fish Stocks
The International Framework
Most Norwegian fish stocks are shared with other countries, pri-
marily the EEC and the Soviet Union. Shortly after the 200-mile
limit was established, general fishing agreements were concluded
with countries sharing fish stocks with Norway—^the EEC, the So-
viet Union, Sweden, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland (Stortingspro-
posisjon Nos. 74 and 92, 1976-1977; Nos. 89 and 141, 1979-1980;
No. 90, 1980-1981). These agreements recognize the right of each
country to determine a catch quota within its exclusive fishing
zone, on the basis of recommendations made by international or-
ganizations and after consuUation with the other country. The
leading international organization in this context is the Interna-
tional Council for the Exploration ofthe Sea (ICES), founded early
in this century for the promotion of biological research on fish in
the northeast Atlantic. Under its auspices, international teams of
fishery biologists meet regularly to assess the status of the various
commercial fish stoeks in the northeast Atlantic. On the basis of
their findings, the ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Man-
agement (ACFM) makes recommendations on TAC, which, in the
ease of shared stocks, must be allocated among the countries con-
cerned. The above mentioned agreements, except the one with
Iceland, do not specify how the allocation is to be made. However,
certain rules pertaining to the allocation of the agreed TAC have
since been established. The Barents Sea eod is, in principle, shared
equally with the Soviet Union, but in recent years oceanographie
conditions and the age structure of the stock have prevented theRognvaldur Hannesson
Soviets from taking their half The Barents Sea capelin is divided
40-60 in favor of Norway, due to her high share of catches in the
past. As for the EEC, the division of TACs is based on the geo-
graphic distribution of stocks at various stages—eggs and larvae,
juveniles, adult fish, and migration and spawning areas (ICES,
1978).
The ^'Scientific Basis" of Management
The recommendations on TAC given by the ACFM are based ex-
clusively on biological criteria, the most important of which is the
ubiquitous "maximum sustainable yield" (MSY) of one species in
isolation. The ACFM has recognized, however, that an immediate
reduction of fishing mortality F to F^^y would, for heavily over-
fished stocks, imply catches so greatly reduced as to be infeasible
in the short run. In such cases the ACFM recommends more mo-
derate management alternatives.
It is not difficult to find faults in the procedure leading to the
recommended TACs; indeed, the ACFM itself is well aware of them.
The MSY criterion is inadequate for two reasons: (1) it takes no
account of economic circumstances, and (2) it considers only one
species at a time, ignoring the interrelations among species. The
latter can be a serious shortcoming when the MSY is calculated
for interrelated species, all of which are being exploited. The ACFM
has recognized the insufficiency of its biological criteria for man-
agement. In its 1981 report to the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (ICES, 1982) it states that
the development of advice for fish stock management should not be
entirely the responsibility of ACFM. Ideally, managerial authorities
would define their objectives for the different stocks or fisheries and
ACFM would thereafter evaluate the biological consequences of these
management strategies and define the biological constraints for the
attainment of these objectives. Without clear objectives at hand from
the managerial bodies, ICES has had to develop certain management
objectives which are mainly based on purely biological considerations.
It is possible to identify two justifications for the dominant role
in the management offish stocks of such unambiguous but insuffi-
cient criteria as F^sv The first justification is sound, the other less
so. Economic considerations are not purely scientific, but alwaysNorway's Fishery Policy
involve an element of judgment. Contentious issues are resolved
through the political process in the formulation of economic policy
at the national level. When two or more sovereign states are in-
volved, no such arbitration is possible. There are bound to be
divergent views on how economic considerations should infiuence
the management of fish stocks. Prices and fishing costs may differ
among nations, and so may the rates of discount applied to future
benefits. All parties bargaining over management options are,
however, presumably interested in conducting their negotiations
on the basis ofthe best available objective information. This explains
why they solicit advice based solely on biological criteria. The MSY
is, however, an insufficient basis for such advice since, as pointed
out by the ACFM, what is needed are analyses of different manage-
ment strategies.
Politics is the other reason why biological criteria, adequate or
not, have come to play such a big role. Management measures will
often be unpopular among fishermen. Even if such measures .are
designed to benefit both fishermen and society at large in the long
run, they will almost certainly demand short-term sacrifices from
the fishermen. Measures that infringe on privileges or rents Ihat
fishermen may have acquired at the expense of society at Iarge will
obviously not be well received. It is inevitably attractive, therefore,
for politicians and civil servants alike to be able to point to "objec-
tive scientific advice" rather than to spell out, in full, the economic
reasoning behind the actions being taken. Fishery biologists have
no reason to welcome the role of scapegoat into which this scenario
casts them.
International Agreements and Domestic Regulation
After the ACFM has given its recommendations, it is up to the
countries sharing a fish stock to accept or modify the advice re-
ceived and to divide the TACs among themselves. Usually the
parties have agreed on catch quotas, but the ACFM's management
policy advice has not always been adopted. Deviations from the
ACFM's recommendations result from economic and political
considerations, usually reflecting less willingness to wait for the
benefit of rebuilding fish stocks than is implied in the advice given132 Rognvaldur Hannesson
by ACFM. For example, while the ACFM recommended a mor-
atorium on the mackerel and herring catch in 1980 and 1981 (Table
2), the EEC and Norway agreed to harvest a limited amount of
mackerel, and Norway permitted a small catch quota to be taken
from the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock, confined at present to the
exclusive Norwegian fishing zone. Even if modifications ofthe catch
quotas recommended by the ACFM are to be expected, given the
narrowness ofthe criteria on which they are based, such changes in
the TACs as have taken place are not necessarily well founded.
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that these changes are the
result of short-term expediency rather than long-term strategy. The
surprisingly wide gap between agreed quotas and actual catches
that has occurred in some cases (Table 2) points in that direction.
For example, catches of herring and mackerel in the North Sea,
Skagerrak, and Kattegat in 1980 and 1981 greatly exceeded the
quotas agreed upon. The reason for this was that the EEC com-
mission had not yet obtained the authority it is supposed to have
over fisheries policy, and it was even unable to keep track of the
catches taken by fishermen from the member countries. The Nor-
wegian quota for Arcto-Norwegian cod has been overfished every
year since 1980, exceeding the TAC in 1981 and 1982. This over-
fishing was due to a loophole in the Soviet-Norwegian agreement,
which provides for an unregulated fishery by the Norwegian coastal
fleet even though the Norwegian quota has been exceeded.
Even more serious tban openly breaching agreements or creep-
ing through loopholes, is the possibility that the parties falsify their
catch statistics in order to show compliance when in fact there is
none. The ACFM has openly alleged that this has occurred, without
naming any culprits (ICES, 1982). Besides contaminating inter-
national relations and destroying confidence, this practice erodes
the very foundation of sound biological advice, based as it is on the
interpretation of catch statistics.
The Making of Norwegian Fishery Regulations
Some regulation of fisheries is usually required in order to fulfill
the annual agreements with other countries on catch quotas and
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regulate the fishing of stocks for which no agreement has been
reached. For example, the fishing of Atianto-Scandian herring is
strictly regulated for the purpose of rebuilding this heavily de-
pleted stock. Negotiations in 1981 with the EEC and Sweden about
catch quotas of herring in Skagerrak and Kattegat were unsuccess-
ful, but Norway nevertheless imposed a quota on her own vessels.
It is the responsibility ofthe director of fisheries to present specific
regulatory measures for each calendar year or fishing season. Before
sending his proposals to the minister of fisheries, the director con-
sults an advisory committee appointed for this purpose by the
government. In this committee, government officials and represen-
tatives ofthe fishing industry are brought together. The committee
is composed of:
Director of fisheries, chairman
Directorate of fisheries, one representative
Director of Marine Research Institute
Ministry of Fisheries, two representatives
Fishermen's Association, five representatives
Fish Processors' Association, one representative
Food Industry Labor Union, one representative
Seamen's Union, one representative.
Broad representation of producers' interests and limited profes-
sional advice arc noteworthy features ofthe committee. In contrast
to the American scientific and statistical committees, there are no
economists, statisticians, or social scientists as such on the advisory
committee, except those serving in the capacity of government of-
ficials and their advisers.'
While the principle of consulting the parties most directly affected
by regulatory measures is praiseworthy, caution is necessary since
interest organizations exist primarily for promoting the self-
interests of their members, if necessary at the expense ofthe general
public. Although being consulted does not amount to making deci-
sions, it is indeed likely to enable the consulted parties to infiuence
the decisions and to bend regulations in their favor. In addition to
being heavily represented on the advisory committee, the Fisher-
men's Association is, as noted above, given the authority to negoti-
ate income support with the government; through the labor market.136 Rognvaldur Hannesson
there is also a certain exchange of personnel between the interest
organizations and the fisheries administration.
The proposals framed by the director of fisheries, in consultation
with the advisory committee, may be characterized as short-run
management for the purpose of achieving an equitable balance of
interests, rather than strategic planning for achieving efficient utili-
zation of resources. While it is true that the proposals refer to re-
gulations to be in effect for one fishing season or calendar year,
they would, under ideal circumstances, be conceived within the
framework of a long-term plan. The strongest example of long-
term planning is in the management of the Atlanto-Scandian her-
ring. After an almost total collapse in the late 1960s, there was,
for some years, a moratorium on catches. This policy has turned
out to be successful: the stock is now recovering, although it is still
far from its previous abundance. Fishery biologists called upon
to give advice on the management ofthis stock, have until recently
unequivocally recommended a total ban on catches, while spokes-
men of the fishing industry have pointed out that a limited quantity
of herring will fetch a high price, and that the markets involved
could be irrevocably lost if not catered to regularly. Since the bulk
of the catches obtainable from a fully recovered stock would end
up as cheap input lo the meal and oil industry, and full recovery
must be regarded as uncertain, the industry's argument makes good
economic sense. The decision to allow limited catches of herring
despite objections from fishery biologists thus appears to be well
taken. This case illustrates the point that biological advice cannot
serve as the sole basis for fish stock management.
Recent events in the management of the Arcto-Norwegian cod,
on the other hand, present an example of short-term expediency
with little long-term planning. As the Soviet Union has caught less
than her quota in recent years, a strict adherence to the Norwegian
quota would have meant a quicker replenishment. This option does
not appear to have been given any serious consideration by the
director of fisheries or the advisory committee. On the contrary,
they appear to have been preoccupied with catching as much as
possible without exceeding the TAC for the stock, although this
was not avoided in 1981 and 1982.Norway's Fishery Policy 137
Inefficiency Through Regulation
Tbe regulations proposed by the director of fisheries, iti cotisultation
with the advisory committee, put a higher premium on equity than
on efficiency. Since 1982, coastal vessels fishing for Arcto-Norwegian
cod bave been regulated by limiting tbe time at sea and in certain
cases tbe total catch. These are measures that attempt to reconcile
excessive catch capacity with a limited catch quota while sharing
the income equitably. Tbis is also tbe purpose of tbe quota regula-
tions in the capelin fisbery., wbere regressive vessel quotas (see Figure
4) in effect since the late 1970s prevent the utilization of economies
of scale but accomplish a high degree of equalization of fishermen's
incomes (see Figure 5). Many regulations of an older vintage are
similarly characterized, such as the ban on using purse seines in
the Lofoten fishery, which has been in effect since the 1950s. While
aimed at protecting tbe cod, the ban protects fishermen using tra-
ditional gear, sucb as long line and gill nets.'^
The emphasis on equity rather than efficiency in the framing of
fishery regulations accords with the shortsightedness ofthe general
public's perception of economic benefits and the political incentives
this gives rise to. The bias toward equity is enhanced by the extensive
consultation with fishermen's interest organizations, which prefer
equalization of incomes to equal opportunity. This may be explained
to some extent by the fact tbat numbers count in any organization,
and tbat the innovative and efiicient tend to be a minority. The
emphasis on equity accords well with the preferences of tbe regula-
tors, who typically are concerned with resolving conflicts and witb
sharing limited resources equitably. While these are praiseworthy
objectives, they lead to a waste of resources and a retardation of
growth in productivity.
Conclusions
Norway's fisheries policy reminds us that market failure is not a suf-
ficient reason for government intervention. One must also consider
wbetber or not governments have tbe rtecessary incentives to im-
prove tbe allocation of resources. Nothing will be gained by sub-
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FIGURE 5. Fishermen's annual remuneration as a percent of fleet average. Dis-
continuity of curves indicates changes in size limits of vessel groups. ---, largest
vessels; , next largest vessels; , next smallest vessels; ,
smallest vessels. Purse seiners.
policy has primarily been one of supporting fishermen's incomes
and maintaining the level of employment in the fisheries, thereby
supporting small and remote settlements dependent on fisheries.
Substantial economic inefficiency in the long and short term has
resulted. In the long term a large excess capacity has been buih up,
while in the short term the regulations needed to reconcile excessive
catch capacity with limited catch quotas have often meant inefficient
utilization of the existing fieet. A heretic might ask whether the
Norwegian economy is any better off than it would be if the fisher-
ies were left to themselves. If they were, fishermen would be fewer
and poorer, but less capital would be wasted on redundant fishing140 Rognvaldur Hannesson
vessels and processitig capacity, atid more manpower would be
available for producing commodities and services other than fish.
Notes
1. The scientific and statistical committees consist of fishery biologists,
economists, and social scientists who advise the regional councils respon-
sible for managing the fisheries. The deliberations of these committees are
open to the public, and representatives of the industry, including those of
foreign countries, have availed themselves of this right.
2. Even Fancien regime could be receptive to requests for protecting less
efficient fishermen. In a letter written in 1744 the Danish king banned the
use of long line and gill nets in the Lofoten fishery and permitted only
tbe traditional hand line. This was done in response to requests from peo-
ple who felt threatened by better-off farmers and townspeople who, it was
said, could afford the novel gear. This story was recently told by Foss (1982).
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